

Mean-field Games for Fun and Profit

Santa Barbara Control Workshop
Decision, Dynamics and Control in Multi-Agent Systems

Sean P. Meyn









Joint work with: H. Yin, T. Yang, P. G. Mehta, and U. V. Shanbhag,

Coordinated Science Laboratory
and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

Thanks to NSF & AFOSR

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Oscillator Games
- 3 Learning
- 4 Particle Filter Games
- 5 Conclusions
- 6 Bibliography



Who Cares About Oscillators?

Background: Economics

Can you spot the lunacy?

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A New Era For Control

We should remove **derivative control** from our engineering curriculum!

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A New Era For Control

We should remove **derivative control** from our engineering curriculum!

Fundamental Theorem of Calculus: If the airplane is flying at level height, then the ultimate contribution of the derivative is *zero*:

$$0 = y(T) - y(0) = \int_0^T \dot{y}(t) dt$$

Background: Economics

Can you spot the lunacy?

A New Era For Government

We should remove **government spending** from our economics curriculum!

Barro-Ricardo Equivalence Proposition: Government budget imbalances are irrelevant to resource allocation. Every dollar of taxes postponed today must be paid with interest tomorrow by the exact same group of taxpayers alive today.

Background: Economics

Saner voices

Ericson and Pakes^[3]

This paper provides a model of firm and industry dynamics that allows for entry, exit and firm-specific uncertainty generating variability in the fortunes of firms. It focuses on the impact of uncertainty arising from investment in research and exploration-type processes. ...

Coupled Markov models to address transients.

—Transients are *everything* in both business and economics

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Computation of Nash equilibria for coupled MDP models?

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Background: Economics

Greater sanity

Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy^[17]

... oblivious equilibrium (OE) is an approximation in which each player makes decisions based on his own state and the “average” state of the other players. ...

Some aspects of dynamics and uncertainty are preserved.


Computation of Nash equilibria is possible.

[17] Markov perfect industry dynamics with many firms, *Econometrica* 2008; [6] Huang et al., *TAC*, 2007


Background: Synchrony in Nature

Synchrony is Good

Pacemaker cells




Laser light




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


Synchrony is Not Good

Bridges



Brains



Question (Fundamental question in Neuroscience)

Why is synchrony (neural rhythms) useful?

Does it have a functional role?

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- Synaptic plasticity via long term potentiation (Hebbian learning)
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
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3 Neuronal computations

- Bayesian inference
- Neural circuits as particle filters (Lee & Mumford)
- T. Yang, P. G. Mehta and S. P. Meyn, " A Control-oriented Approach for Particle Filtering," ACC&CDC 2011

Background: Kuramoto model

$$d\theta_i(t) = \left(\omega_i + \frac{\kappa}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \sin(\theta_j(t) - \theta_i(t)) \right) dt + \sigma d\xi_i(t), \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$





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ω_i : taken from distribution $g(\omega)$ over $[1 - \gamma, 1 + \gamma]$


γ : measures the heterogeneity of the population



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
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
- κ : measures the strength of coupling



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




Oscillator Games


Oscillator Game

N oscillators with natural frequency ω_i ,
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
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Dynamics of i^{th} oscillator,
$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i(t))dt + \sigma d\xi_i$$

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
Dynamics of i^{th} oscillator, $d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i(t))dt + \sigma d\xi_i$

Oscillator seeks control $u_i(\cdot)$ to minimize,

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
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Cost of anarchy,

$$c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta_i - \theta_j)$$



Mean-field model

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$$c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta_i, \theta_j(t)) \xrightarrow{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{c}(\theta_i, t)$$

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Letting $N \rightarrow \infty$ and assume $c(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) \rightarrow \bar{c}(\theta_i, t)$

$$\text{HJB: } \partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \Rightarrow h(\theta, t, \omega)$$

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Solution to PDE \implies Oblivious control for i th oscillator,

$$u_i^o = -\frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} h(\theta(t), t, \omega) \Big|_{\omega=\omega_i}$$

Theorem: ε -Nash equilibrium property,

$$\eta_i(u_i^o; u_{-i}^o) \leq \eta_i(u_i; u_{-i}^o) + O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\right), \quad i = 1, \dots, N,$$

for any adapted control u_i .

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
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Solution to PDE?


Incoherent Solution

$$h(\theta, t, \omega) \equiv 0, \quad \rho(\theta, t, \omega) \equiv \frac{1}{2\pi}$$



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
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
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


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
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Examples of Solutions: Incoherence and Synchrony





Incoherence



Synchrony


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
Bifurcation



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$$\eta_i(u_i; u_{-i}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T E[c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) + \frac{1}{2} R u_i^2] ds$$

Yin et al., ACC 2010





$$d\theta_i = \left(\omega_i + \frac{\kappa}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \sin(\theta_j - \theta_i) \right) dt + \sigma d\xi_i$$

Strogatz et al., J. Stat. Phys., 1991

Comparison of controls

Control law




$$u_i = \varphi(\theta, t, \omega_i) := -\frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} h(\theta, t, \omega) \Big|_{\omega=\omega_i}$$





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► Mean-field Filter

Learning to Control

Approximate Dynamic Programming

- Optimality equation $\min_{u_i} \underbrace{\{c(\theta; \theta_{-i}(t)) + \frac{1}{2}Ru_i^2 + \mathcal{D}_{u_i}h_i(\theta, t)\}}_{=: H_i(\theta, u_i; \theta_{-i}(t))} = \eta_i^*$

Approximate Dynamic Programming

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- Optimal control law

$$u_i^* = -\frac{1}{R}\partial_{\theta}h_i(\theta, t)$$

Approximate Dynamic Programming

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$$u_i^* = -\frac{1}{R}\partial_{u_i}h_i(\theta, t)$$

- Parameterization for approximation:

$$H_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)}(\theta, u_i; \theta_{-i}(t)) = c(\theta; \theta_{-i}(t)) + \frac{1}{2}Ru_i^2 + (\omega_i - 1 + u_i)A_iS^{(\phi_i)} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}A_iC^{(\phi_i)}$$

where

$$S^{(\phi)}(\theta, \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta - \theta_j - \phi), \quad C^{(\phi)}(\theta, \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \cos(\theta - \theta_j - \phi)$$

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- Approx. optimal control:

$$u_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)} = \arg \min_{u_i} \{H_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)}(\theta, u_i; \theta_{-i}(t))\} = -\frac{A_i}{RN} \sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta - \theta_j(t) - \phi_i)$$

Learning algorithm

- Bellman error:

Pointwise: $\mathcal{L}^{(A_i, \phi_i)}(\theta, t) = \min_{u_i} \{H_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)}\} - \eta_i^{(A_i^*, \phi_i^*)}$

- Stochastic approximation based on ODE,

$$\tilde{e}(A_i, \phi_i) = \sum_{k=1}^2 |\langle \mathcal{L}^{(A_i, \phi_i)}, \tilde{\phi}_k(\theta) \rangle|^2$$

$$\frac{dA_i}{dt} = -\varepsilon \frac{d\tilde{e}(A_i, \phi_i)}{dA_i}, \quad \frac{d\phi_i}{dt} = -\varepsilon \frac{d\tilde{e}(A_i, \phi_i)}{d\phi_i}$$

Learning algorithm



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
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


Comparison of average cost

$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i)dt + \sigma d\xi_i \quad u_i = -\frac{A_i^*}{RN} \sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta_i - \theta_j(t) - \phi_i^*)$$

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
Particle Filter Games

Filtering problem

Signal, observation processes:

$$d\theta_t = \omega dt + \sigma_B dB_t \quad \text{mod } 2\pi$$

$$dZ_t = h(\theta_t) dt + \sigma_W dW_t$$




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Nonlinear Filtering


Objective: estimate the posterior distribution p^* of θ_t given \mathcal{Z}^t .

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Nonlinear Filtering

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Solution approaches:


- Linear system: [Kalman filter](#) (R. E. Kalman, 1960)
- Nonlinear system: [Wonham filter](#) (W. M. Wonham, 1965)
- Numerical Methods: [Particle filter](#) (N. J. Gordon et al., 1993)

Feedback Particle Filter

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Feedback Particle Filter

Particles evolve as controlled SDEs with independent noise,


$$d\theta_t^i = \omega dt + \sigma_B dB_t^i + dU_t^i \quad \text{mod } 2\pi, \quad i = 1, \dots, N.$$

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Objective: Choose control U_t^i so that,


$$P\{\theta_t^i \in \cdot \mid Z_0^t\} = p^* = P\{\theta_t \in \cdot \mid Z_0^t\}$$

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$$P\{\theta_t^i \in \cdot \mid Z_0^t\} = p^* = P\{\theta_t \in \cdot \mid Z_0^t\}$$

\implies Empirical distribution of particles approximates p^* .

Filtering for Oscillator

Signal, observation processes:

$$d\theta_t = \omega dt + \sigma_B dB_t \quad \text{mod } 2\pi$$


$$dZ_t = h(\theta_t) dt + \sigma_W dW_t$$

Particle evolution,

$$d\theta_t^i = \omega dt + \sigma_B dB_t^i + v(\theta_t^i) \left[dZ_t - \frac{1}{2} (h(\theta_t^i) + \hat{h}) dt \right] \\ + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_W^2 v v' dt \quad \text{mod } 2\pi, \quad i = 1, \dots, N.$$

Observer gain $v(\theta_t^i)$ is obtained via the solution of an E-L equation,

$$-\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \left(\frac{1}{p(\theta, t)} \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \{ p(\theta, t) v(\theta, t) \} \right) = -\frac{\sin \theta}{\sigma_W^2}$$



Filtering for Oscillator

Fourier form of $p(\theta, t)$,

$$p(\theta, t) = \frac{1}{2\pi} + P_s(t)\sin\theta + P_c(t)\cos\theta$$

Approx. solution of E-L equation, using a perturbation method:

$$v(\theta, t) = \frac{1}{2\sigma_W^2} \left\{ -\sin\theta + \frac{\pi}{2} [P_c(t)\sin 2\theta - P_s(t)\cos 2\theta] \right\},$$

$$v'(\theta, t) = \frac{1}{2\sigma_W^2} \left\{ -\cos\theta + \pi [P_c(t)\cos 2\theta + P_s(t)\sin 2\theta] \right\}$$

where


$$P_c(t) \approx \bar{P}_c^{(N)}(t) = \frac{1}{\pi N} \sum_{j=1}^N \cos \theta_t^j, \quad P_s(t) \approx \bar{P}_s^{(N)}(t) = \frac{1}{\pi N} \sum_{j=1}^N \sin \theta_t^j.$$

Simulation Results

Signal, observation processes:

$$d\theta_t = 1 dt + 0.5 dB_t \quad \text{mod } 2\pi$$

$$dZ_t = h(\theta_t) dt + 0.4 dW_t$$



$N = 100$ particles,


$$d\theta_t^i = 1 dt + 0.5 dB_t^i + U(\theta_t^i; \bar{P}_c^{(N)}(t), \bar{P}_s^{(N)}(t)) \quad \text{mod } 2\pi$$

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


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


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
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
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Variance Reduction

Filtering for simple linear model.

Mean-square error:
$$\frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \left(\frac{\Sigma_t^{(N)} - \Sigma_t}{\Sigma_t} \right)^2 dt$$



Conclusions

Fun and Profit?

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- Without doubt, MFGs provide a great playground.

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The Feedback Particle Filter is a great playground, and has enormous potential for approximate nonlinear filtering in practice.

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The Feedback Particle Filter is a great playground, and has enormous potential for approximate nonlinear filtering in practice.

Perhaps this is where the profit lies?

Thank you!

Collaborators



Huibing Yin



Tao Yang




















Prashant Mehta



Uday Shanbhag

- "Q-learning and Pontryagin's Minimum Principle," CDC 2009
- "Synchronization of coupled oscillators is a game," IEEE TAC, ACC 2010
- "Learning in Mean-Field Oscillator Games," CDC 2010
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- "Feedback Particle Filter with Mean-field Coupling," CDC2011

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